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Abstract
This article explores whether the null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) framework provides a sufficient basis for
the evaluation of statistical model assumptions. It is argued that while NHST-based tests can provide some degree of
confirmation for the model assumption that is evaluated—formulated as the null hypothesis—these tests do not inform us
of the degree of support that the data provide for the null hypothesis and to what extent the null hypothesis should be
considered to be plausible after having taken the data into account. Addressing the prior plausibility of the model assumption
is unavoidable if the goal is to determine how plausible it is that the model assumption holds. Without assessing the prior
plausibility of the model assumptions, it remains fully uncertain whether the model of interest gives an adequate description
of the data and thus whether it can be considered valid for the application at hand. Although addressing the prior plausibility
is difficult, ignoring the prior plausibility is not an option if we want to claim that the inferences of our statistical model can
be relied upon.
Keywords Statistical inference · Bayesian statistics · Belief updating · Statistics
Introduction
One of the core objectives of the social sciences is to
critically evaluate its theories on the basis of empirical
observations. Bridging this gap between data and theory is
achieved through statistical modeling: Only if a statistical
model is specified can the data be brought to bear upon
the scientific theory. Without making assumptions about
the statistical model, no conclusions can be drawn about
the hypotheses of substantive interest. While in practice
these statistical model assumptions may often be glossed
over, establishing these assumptions to be plausible is
crucial for establishing the validity of the inferences:
Only if the statistical model is specified (approximately)
correctly can inferences about hypotheses of interest be
relied upon. Hence, critically evaluating the statistical
model assumptions is of crucial importance for scientific
enquiry. These statistical model assumptions can themselves
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be investigated using statistical methods, many of which
make use of null-hypothesis significance tests (NHST).
As the statement of the American Statistical Association
exemplifies (Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016), recently much
attention in psychology and related fields has been
devoted to problems that arise when NHST is employed
to evaluate substantive hypotheses. Criticisms of NHST
are usually two-fold. Firstly, it is noted that in practice
NHST is often abused to draw inferences that are not
warranted by the procedure (Meehl, 1978; Cohen, 1994;
Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987; Gigerenzer, 1993). For
instance, it is noted that NHST is not actually used to
critically test the substantive hypothesis of interest (Cohen,
1994), that practitioners often conclude that a significant
result indicates that the null hypothesis is false and the
alternative hypothesis is true or likely to be true (Gigerenzer,
2004), that a p value is taken to be the probability that
the observed result was due to chance (rather than a
probability conditional on the null hypothesis being true,
Cohen, 1994; Wagenmakers, 2007), and that a significant
result is taken to indicate that the finding is likely
to replicate (Gigerenzer, 2000). The second criticism is
that the types of inferences that one can draw on the
basis of NHST are of limited use for the evaluation of
scientific theories (Gigerenzer &Murray, 1987; Gigerenzer,
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1993, 2004), with alternatives such as using confidence
intervals (Cumming & Finch, 2005; Fidler & Loftus, 2009;
Cumming, 2014) or Bayesian approaches (Wagenmakers,
2007) being proposed as more informative and more
appropriate tools for statistical inference. These criticisms
have been unanimous in their rejection of the use of (solely)
NHST-based methods for evaluating substantive hypotheses
and have had an important impact on both recommended
and actual statistical practices, although the uncritical and
inappropriate use of NHST unfortunately still appears to be
quite common in practice.
The attention in the discussion of the (in)adequacy
of NHST has focused almost exclusively on the use of
NHST for the evaluation of substantive hypotheses. Impor-
tantly, standard methods for assessing whether statistical
model assumptions hold often rely on NHST as well (e.g.,
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001; Field, 2009), and are even
employed when the substantive analyses do not use NHST
(e.g., item response theory; Lord, 1980). These NHST pro-
cedures formulate the model assumption as a statistical
hypothesis, but—unlike the statistical hypothesis derived
from the substantive hypothesis—treat this hypothesis as
a null hypothesis to be falsified. It may also be noted
here that despite users usually being interested in deter-
mining whether the model assumption at least approxi-
mately holds, the null hypothesis that is tested specifies
that the model assumption holds exactly, something that
often may not be plausible a priori. Given the differences
in the way NHST deals with model assumptions compared to
substantive hypotheses, given the different purpose of assess-
ing model assumptions (i.e., evaluating the adequacy of the
statistical model), and given the common usage of NHST
for evaluating model assumptions, it is important to specifi-
cally consider the use of NHST for the evaluation of model
assumptions and the unique issues that arise in that context.
This paper explores whether NHST-based approaches suc-
ceed in providing sufficient information to determine how
plausible it is that a model assumption holds, and whether
a model assumption is plausible enough to be accepted.
The paper starts out with a short motivating example,
aimed at clarifying the specific issues that arise when
model assumptions are evaluated using null hypothesis
tests. In “The NHST framework”, the background of the
NHST framework is discussed, as well as the specific
issues that arise when it is applied to evaluate model
assumptions. “Confirmation of model assumptions using
NHST” explores the extent to which a null hypothe-
sis significance test can provide confirmation for the
model assumption it evaluates. “Revisiting the motivating
example” briefly returns to the motivating example, where
it is illustrated how Bayesian methods that do not rely on
NHST may provide a more informative and appropriate
alternative for evaluating model assumptions.
Amotivating example
Consider a researcher who wants to find out whether
it makes sense to develop different types of educational
material for boys and for girls, as (we assume) is predicted
by a particular theory. Specifically, the researcher is
interested in children’s speed of spatial reasoning. She
constructs a set of ten items to measure this ability and for
each respondent records the total response time.
Assume that the researcher plans on using Student’s
independent samples t test to compare the average response
speed of boys and girls. Before she can interpret the results
of this t test, she has to make sure that the assumptions
are met. In this case, she has to check whether both the
response times of the boys and the response times of the
girls are independently and identically distributed, whether
the distributions are Gaussian, and whether the variances
of these distributions are the same (Student, 1908; Field,
2009). The researcher is aware of the unequal variances t
test (Welch, 1947) (i.e., a different statistical model), but
because this procedure has lower power, she prefers to use
Student’s.
For simplicity, consider only the assumption of equal
variances. In this case, Levene’s test (Levene, 1960) can be
used to evaluate the null hypothesis H0 : σ 2boys = σ 2girls .
Assume that Levene’s test yields a p value of 0.060, which
exceeds the level of significance (which for Levene’s test
is usually set to 0.05 or 0.01, Field, 2009).1 The researcher
concludes that there is no reason to worry about a violation
of the assumption of equal variances, and proceeds to apply
Student’s t test (using α = 0.05). The t test shows that
boys are significantly faster than girls in solving the spatial
reasoning items (p = 0.044). The researcher notes that her
statistical software also produces the output for the t test
for groups with unequal variances (Welch, 1947), which
yields p = 0.095. However, since Levene’s test did not
indicate a violation of the assumption of equal variances, the
researcher feels justified in ignoring the results of the Welch
test and sticks to her conclusion that there is a significant
difference between the two groups.
The present example is meant to exemplify how
statistical model assumptions are commonly dealt with in
practice (see also Gigerenzer, 2004). Important questions
can be asked about the justification of the inferences made
in this example, and in cases like this in general. Should
the researcher be worried about her model assumption if
she has background knowledge that boys commonly show a
larger variance in cognitive processing speed than girls? Can
she safely conclude that the variances are indeed equal in
1The results reported in this paragraph have been obtained based on
a set of fictional data, created for illustrative purposes and available
in the supplementary material of this manuscript on the Open Science
Framework at http://osf.io/rh8qn.
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the population and that the model assumption holds, or that
this is at least very likely? And if there remains uncertainty
about the plausibility of this model assumption, how should
this uncertainty influence her statistical inferences?
Questions like these are not restricted to the application
of t tests, but apply equally strongly to all areas where
statistical models are used to make inferences, and includes
areas where the option of simply using a less restrictive
model (e.g., using Welch’s t test rather than Student’s) is
not readily available. Since statistical inferences based on
these models often form the basis for updating our scientific
beliefs as well as for taking action, determining whether
we can rely on inferences that are made about model
assumptions using NHST is of both theoretical and practical
importance.
The NHST framework
Background of the NHST framework
The basis of the NHST framework goes back to the
statistical paradigm founded by Fisher in the 1930s (Fisher,
1930, 1955, 1956, 1960; Hacking, 1976; Gigerenzer, 1993),
as well as the statistical paradigm founded by Neyman
and Pearson in that same period (Neyman, 1937, 1957;
Pearson, 1955; Neyman & Pearson, 1967; Hacking, 1976;
Gigerenzer, 1993). Whereas Neyman and Pearson proposed
to contrast two hypotheses that are in principle on equal
footing, Fisher’s approach focuses on evaluating the fit of
a single hypothesis to the data, and has a strong focus
on falsification. Starting from the 1950s, elements from
both approaches were incorporated in the hybrid NHST
framework as it exists today in the social and behavioral
sciences (Gigerenzer &Murray, 1987; Gigerenzer, Swijtink,
Porter, Daston, Beatty, & Krüger, 1989; Gigerenzer,
1993; Lehmann, 2006): While this framework proposes
to evaluate a null hypothesis in contrast to an alternative
hypothesis—in line with Neyman and Pearson—the focus
lies on attempting to reject the null hypothesis, in line
with Fisher’s methodology. Thus, despite the important
differences that existed between the paradigms of Fisher and
that of Neyman and Pearson (Gigerenzer, 1993), the current
framework constitutes a hybrid form of the two paradigms
(Gigerenzer et al., 1989; Gigerenzer, 1993; Hubbard &
Bayarri, 2003).
In line with Fisher, in NHST, the evaluation of the
null hypothesis is done solely based on the p value:
the probability of observing an outcome under the null
hypothesis that is at least as extreme as the outcome that
was observed. If the p value falls below a preset level of
significance α, it is concluded that the data are unlikely to be
observed under the null hypothesis (in line with Fisher), in
which case the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative
hypothesis is accepted (in line with Neyman and Pearson).
If p ≥ α, the null hypothesis is retained, but no conclusions
are drawn about the truth of the null hypothesis (Fisher,
1955).
Because the NHST framework explicitly does not
address the probability that the null hypothesis is true
(Edwards, Lindman & Savage, 1963), NHST remains silent
about the effect that a failure to reject the null hypothesis
should have on our assessment of the plausibility of the null
hypothesis—the extent or degree to which we believe that it
is credible or likely to be true. Similar to the way in which
Popper suggests to evaluate theories (Popper, 1959), null
hypotheses are simply considered hypotheses that have not
yet successfully been rejected, but should not be considered
to be likely to be true.
Differences between evaluating substantive
hypotheses andmodel assumptions
Many authors have criticized the use of NHST for the
evaluation of substantive hypotheses (see for example
Meehl, 1978; Cohen, 1994; Gigerenzer, 2004; Wagenmak-
ers, 2007). However, the use of NHST for the evaluation of
model assumptions differs in at least three important ways
from the use of NHST for evaluating substantive theories,
making it important to specifically consider the merits and
demerits of employing NHST in the context of evaluating
model assumptions.
One important difference lies in the type of inference that
is desired. In the context of evaluating scientific theories,
one can argue that conclusions about substantive hypotheses
are always provisional, and that we should refrain from
drawing any strong conclusions on the basis of a single
hypothesis test, requiring instead that the results are to
be consistently replicable. In this context, one can argue
(Mayo, 1996) that the only probabilities that are relevant
are the error probabilities of the procedure (in the case of
NHST the Type I and Type II error), and one can in principle
refrain from taking action on the basis of finite, and
hence principally inconclusive, evidence. Unfortunately,
this appeal to the long-run success of the procedure is not
available when evaluating model assumptions, since in that
context we always need to make a decision about whether
in this particular instance we will proceed to apply the
statistical model (i.e., acting as though its assumptions have
been met).
A second important difference lies in the fact that
when evaluating model assumptions using NHST, the
null hypothesis is actually the hypothesis of interest,
rather than a ‘no effect’ or ‘nil’ hypothesis (Cohen,
1994) that the researcher hopes to reject in favor of the
proposed alternative. Thus, while substantive hypotheses
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are only evaluated indirectly by attempting to reject a
null hypothesis, when model assumptions are concerned,
researchers are testing the relevant hypothesis ‘directly’,
sticking (at least at first glance) more closely to the idea that
one should aim to falsify one’s hypotheses and expose them
to a critical test (see e.g., Mayo, 1996). In this sense, the use
of NHST for evaluating model assumptions may escape the
criticism (Cohen, 1994) that the hypothesis of interest is not
the hypothesis that is actually critically tested.
A third difference concerns the desired control over
NHST’s two main error probabilities: the probability of
incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true
(Type I error), and the probability of failing to reject it when
it is false (Type II error). By testing the hypothesis of interest
directly, the use of NHST for evaluating model assumptions
implies an important shift in the relative importance of
Type I and Type II errors compared to its use for the
evaluation of substantive hypotheses. In this latter setting,
the standard approach to using NHST is to fix the level of
significance, ensuring control over the Type I error rate, and
only then (if at all) consider the power of the procedure
to detect meaningful deviations from this null hypothesis.
However, when model assumptions are concerned, Type
II errors are arguably much more harmful than Type I
errors, as they result in the unwarranted use of statistical
procedures and in incorrect inferences about the substantive
hypotheses (e.g., due to inflated Type I error rates, overly
small confidence intervals, or parameter bias). Thus, the
standard practice of mainly focusing on controlling the
Type I error rate by selecting an acceptably low level of
significance α does not appear to translate well to the
evaluation of model assumptions, since this leaves the more
important Type II error rate uncontrolled and dependent
on factors such as sample size that should arguably not
affect the severity with which we critically evaluate our
assumptions. While controlling the Type I error rate may
often be straightforward, controlling the Type II error rate
will be problematic for researchers who do not assess the
plausibility of model assumptions and the size of possible
violations, as will be shown in “Assessing the plausibility of
H0 using a null hypothesis test”.
Using null hypothesis tests to evaluatemodel
assumptions
The standard way in which NHST is used to evaluate a
model assumption is by formulating that assumption as a
simple null hypothesis, stating that, for example, a set of
parameters (e.g., group variances) are exactly the same.
While less common, one could also consider using the
NHST framework to assess whether a model assumption is
approximately satisfied; that is, whether it falls within the
bounds of what is considered acceptable for the model when
we take the robustness of the model against violations of
that assumption into account. Under such an approach, one
would consider a composite null hypothesis that states that
the differences between those parameters are not too large
(e.g., that none of the group variances differ by more than a
factor 10) for the model inferences to be seriously affected
(see also Berger & Delampady, 1987; Hoijtink, 2012).
While the statistical hypothesis that is tested would differ,
the motivation for testing that hypothesis using NHST
would be the same: to determine whether inferences based
on the model can be trusted. Because of this similarity,
the issues concerning the use of NHST for evaluating
model assumptions discussed in this paper apply equally to
the use of standard null hypothesis tests and approximate
null hypothesis tests.2 Since practically all standard use
of NHST for evaluating model assumptions makes use of
simple null hypotheses these shall be the focus of most
of the article, but the relevance of using approximate
null hypotheses is revisited at the end of “Assessing the
plausibility of H0 using a null hypothesis test”.
The difficulty lies in the fact that the NHST framework
normally informs us that a nonrejection of the null
hypothesis does not confirm the null hypothesis. This
strict and Fisherian application of the NHST framework
(here called ‘strict approach’) only informs us whether the
model should be considered to be inappropriate and not
whether we can assume that it is correct. While this strict
position may be theoretically defensible, its implications
are highly restrictive and do not match scientific practice.
That is, using only NHST, no model assumption would ever
receive any degree of confirmation from the data, and their
plausibility would always remain completely uncertain.
Since claiming that we never have any evidence in favor
of statistical model assumptions would make all statistical
inference arbitrary, it is assumed in the remainder of the
paper that the application of the NHST framework to model
assumptions only makes sense if it allows for some form of
confirmation of the null hypothesis, and hence that the strict
approach cannot be defended in practice.
One way to avoid the implication that we cannot put any
faith in our statistical models is to change the implication
of a nonrejection of H0: Instead of retaining it, we could
decide to accept it. This ‘confirmatory approach’ seems to
be implicitly embraced in practice (and in the motivating
example), where researchers check their assumptions and
in the absence of falsification proceed as though the
assumption has been confirmed. It can also be thought
to be in line with the decision-oriented methodology of
Neyman and Pearson, where after performing a statistical
2With the notable exception that in practice approximate null
hypotheses are likely to be much more plausible.
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test one of the two hypotheses is accepted. However, for this
confirmatory approach to be defensible, it has to be argued
that a nonrejection of H0 should provide us with sufficient
reason to accept H0, which will be explored in the next
section.
Another possible response to the problems of the strict
approach to NHST is to abandon the idea that a dichotomous
decision needs to be made about the model assumption
based on the outcome of the null hypothesis test. Instead,
one could decide to always continue using the statistical
model, while taking into consideration that a model
assumption for which a significant result was obtained may
be less plausible than one for which no significant result
was obtained. This would mean treating the significance of
the test statistic as a dichotomous measure that provides us
with some degree of support in favor (i.e., nonsignificant)
or against (i.e., significant) the model assumption, which is
evidence that we should take into account when determining
the extent to which we can rely on inferences based on the
model. The feasibility of this ‘evidential approach’ to NHST
is also considered in the next section.
Confirmation of model assumptions using
NHST
The previous section concluded with two possible adapta-
tions of the NHST framework that could potentially make
NHST suitable for the evaluation of model assumptions.
However, the possible success of both approaches hinges
on whether NHST is able to provide the user with suffi-
cient information to assess the plausibility of the model
assumption. This section explores whether this is the case,
for which the concept of plausibility will first need to be
further defined.
Prior and posterior plausibility of themodel
assumption
Let us formalize the notion of plausibility by requiring
it to take on a value that can range from 0 (completely
implausible or certainly wrong) to 1 (completely plausible
or certainly right) (see also Jaynes, 1968, 2003). This value
represents the degree of plausibility that is assigned to a
proposition, for example the proposition ‘H0 is true’.
Since model assumptions are arguably either true or false, if
we had complete information, there would be no uncer-
tainty about the model assumptions and we would assign a
value of either 0 or 1 to the plausibility of a model assump-
tion being true. However, researchers are forced to assess
the plausibility of the assumption using incomplete infor-
mation, and their assessment of the plausibility depends on
the limited information that they have and the way in which
they evaluate this information. Thus, when we speak of the
plausibility of a model assumption, it will always be con-
ditional on the person that is doing the evaluation and the
information that she has.
Denote the plausibility of a hypothesis H0 as it is
assessed by a rational and coherent person j by Pj (H0)
(see also Jaynes, 2003). Such rational and coherent persons
may not actually exist, but can serve as idealizations for
the way in which we should revise our beliefs in the face
of new evidence. Thus, Pj (H0) represents the degree to
which person j believes in the proposition ‘H0 is true’, and
it therefore informs us to what extent person j thinks that
it is probable that H0 is true. In line with the Bayesian
literature on statistics and epistemology, this ‘degree of
belief’ could also be called the ‘subjective probability’ or
‘personal probability’ that a person assigns to the truth of
a proposition (see Savage, 1972; Howson & Urbach, 1989;
Earman, 1992; Suppes, 2007). As a way of quantifying this
degree of belief, we could imagine asking this person how
many cents she would be willing to bet on the claim that
H0 is true if she will receive 1 dollar in the case that H0 is
indeed true (Ramsey, 1926; Gillies, 2000).
It is important to emphasize that this degree of belief need
not be arbitrary, in the sense of depending on the subjective
whims or preferences of the person (Jeffreys, 1961; Howson
& Urbach, 1989; Lee & Wagenmakers, 2005). Rather, we
can demand that the belief is rationally constructed on
the basis of the set of information that is available to the
person and a set of rules of reasoning (Jaynes, 1968, 2003).
The idea would be to use methods to elicit the relevant
information that a person may have and to translate this
information through a carefully designed and objective set
of operations into an assessment of the prior plausibility (see
also Kadane & Wolfson, 1998; O’Hagan, 1998; O’Hagan
et al., 2006). This assessment would only be subjective in
the sense that persons might differ in the information that is
available to them, and we may require that persons with the
same information available to them should reach the same
assessment of prior plausibility, making the assessment
itself objective.
Let us assume that person j has obtained a data set
X—the data to which she hopes to apply the model—and
that she wants to determine how plausible it is that H0
holds after having taken the data into consideration. Let
us call her prior assessment Pj (H0) of the plausibility of
H0 before considering the data X the prior plausibility.
Since person j wants to determine whether she should trust
inferences based on the model, she wants to make use
of the information in the data to potentially improve her
assessment of the plausibility of H0. Thus, to make a better
assessment of how plausible H0 is, she wants to update her
prior belief based on the information in the data. Let us
call this assessment of the plausibility that has been updated
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based on the data X person j ’s posterior plausibility, which
we denote by Pj (H0|X).
Relevance of prior knowledge about themodel
assumption
Since both the confirmatory and the evidential approach
to NHST posit that our evaluation of the plausibility of
H0 should be based only on the data (see also Trafimow,
2003), they tell us that our informed prior beliefs about the
possible truth of H0 should be completely overridden by
the data. The idea is that this way the influence of possible
subjective considerations is minimized (see also Mayo,
1996). Proponents of the NHST framework cannot allow
the prior assessment of the plausibility of H0 to influence
the conclusions that are drawn about the plausibility of H0
without abandoning the idea that the p value contains all
the relevant information about the plausibility ofH0. Hence,
it will be assumed that if person j follows NHST-based
guidelines in assessing the plausibility of H0, Pj (H0|X)
will not depend on Pj (H0), but solely depends on the p
value.
However, there are clear cases where our assessment
of the plausibility of H0 should depend on our prior
knowledge if we are to be consistent. If for some reason
we already know the truth or falsehood of H0, then basing
our assessment of the plausibility purely on the result of a
null hypothesis test—with the possibility of a Type I and
Type II error, respectively—can only make our assessment
of the plausibility of H0 worse, not better. When we know in
advance that a model assumption is wrong, failing to reject
it should not in any way influence our assessment of the
assumption.
More generally, one can conclude that the less plausible
a null hypothesis is on the basis of the background
information, the more hesitant we should be to consider
it to be plausible if it fails to be rejected. In the context
of the motivating example, the researcher may be aware
of previous research indicating that boys generally show
greater variance in cognitive processing speed than girls.
This could give her strong reasons to suspect that boys
will also show greater variance on her particular measure
than girls. This background information would then be
incorporated in her assessment of the plausibility of the
assumption of equal variance before she considers the
data. In this case, the researcher would assign low prior
plausibility (e.g., Pj (H0) = .1 or even Pj (H0) = .01) to the
assumption of equal variances. The data may subsequently
provide us with relevant information about the model
assumption, but this should influence our assessment of the
plausibility of H0 in a way that is consistent with our prior
assessment of the plausibility of H0. That is, Pj (H0|X)
should depend on Pj (H0).
Assessing the plausibility of H0 using a null
hypothesis test
To examine how NHSTmay help to evaluate the plausibility
of a statistical model assumption, let us further examine
the hypothetical case of researcher j who wants to apply
a statistical model to a data set X, and who wants to
evaluate one of the assumptions defining that model. In
line with standard practice, let us assume that the model
assumption that she evaluates is formulated as a simple
null hypothesis, specifying that a parameter has a specific
value. For example, this null hypothesis could correspond
to the assumption of equal variances that was discussed in
the motivating example, in which case H0 : δ = 1, where
δ = σ 2boys/σ 2girls .
The researcher has some prior beliefs about the
plausibility of this assumption, based on the background
information that she has about the particular situation
she is dealing with. Since research never takes place in
complete isolation from all previous research or substantive
theory, the researcher will always have some background
knowledge that is relevant for the particular context that she
is in. If the researcher assigns either a probability of 0 or 1 to
the model assumption being true before observing the data,
she will consider statistically testing this hypothesis to be
redundant. Thus, if researcher j tests H0, we have to assume
that
0 < Pj (H0) < 1. (1)
Let us also assume that the researcher applies a null
hypothesis test to the data X, and that she contrasts H0
with an alternative simple hypothesis Hi (e.g., specifying a
specific non-unity ratio for the variances). This procedure
results either in a significant or a nonsignificant test statistic.
For now, we will assume that the researcher follows
the guidelines of the confirmatory approach to NHST.
Thus, a significant test statistic results in the researcher
rejecting H0—the event of which is denoted by R—and a
nonsignificant value means thatH0 is accepted—denoted by
¬R.
For the test statistic to provide some form of justification
for accepting (or rejecting) H0 over Hi , it must also be the
case that
P(R|H0) < P (R|Hi). (2)
From Eq. 2 it follows that
P(¬R|H0) = 1− P(R|H0) > P (¬R|Hi) = 1− P(R|Hi).
(3)
Thus, a failure to reject H0 is more likely under H0 than
under Hi .
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For convenience, let us assume that Eq. 2 holds for all pos-
sible simple alternatives of H0 (which are all mutually
exclusive andwhich as a set together withH0 are exhaustive),
P(R|H0) < P (R|Hi), for all i. (4)
Equation 4 generally holds for NHST-based tests for model
assumptions, such as Levene’s test for equality of variances
(Levene, 1960). Let us denote the composite hypothesis that
is the complement of H0 by ¬H0. Because the complement
incorporates all possible alternatives to H0, ¬H0 is also
known as the ‘catch-all’ hypothesis (Fitelson, 2006, 2007).
For the evaluation of model assumptions using NHST, the
alternative hypothesis needs to correspond to the catch-
all hypothesis, since the two hypotheses together should
be exhaustive if we are to assess the plausibility of the
assumption.
Our assessment of the probability of obtaining a
nonsignificant test statistic under the catch-all hypothesis
depends on how plausible we consider each of the possible
alternatives to H0 to be. That is,
βj = Pj (¬R|¬H0) =
∑
i P (¬R|Hi)Pj (Hi)∑
i Pj (Hi)
, (5)
where βj denotes person j ’s assessment of the probability
of a Type II error. Thus, βj depends on the person that
evaluates it, since P(R|Hi) will differ for different His
and persons may differ with respect to their values for
each Pj (Hi). The power to detect a violation of the model
assumption under the catch-all hypothesis thus cannot be
assessed without considering the prior plausibility of each
of the possible alternatives to H0.3 In the context of our
motivating example, our assessment of the power of the test
depends on what values for σ 2boys and σ
2
girls we consider to
be plausible. If we expect a large difference between the two
variances, we would expect the testing procedure to have a
higher power to detect these differences than if we expect a
small difference.
Equation 4 implies that
α = P(R|H0) < 1 − βj . (6)
Equation 6 informs us that the power of the test to detect
a violation of the model assumption is larger than the
probability of a Type I error given the truth of H0. From
Eq. 6 it also follows that
P(¬R|H0) = 1 − P(R|H0) > 1 − Pj (R|¬H0) = Pj (¬R|¬H0). (7)
3It may be noted that calculating the power based on the estimated
effect size (i.e., post hoc power analysis) does not avoid this issue,
since it amounts to assuming prior knowledge that each possible
alternative to H0 is equally probable (e.g., see Jeffreys, 1961, pp.
117/118), which often may not be a reasonable starting point.
Equation 7 informs us that a nonrejection is more likely
under H0 than under ¬H0. Thus, obtaining a nonsignificant
test statistic should increase person j ’s assessment of the
plausibility of H0,
Pj (H0|¬R) > Pj (H0). (8)
Hence, a null hypothesis test can indeed provide some
degree of confirmation for the model assumption it
evaluates. However, based on Eq. 8 alone, we do not know
how plausible H0 is after a failure to reject it, nor do we
know how much more plausible it has become due to this
nonrejection.
The degree to which H0 has become more plausible
after having obtained a nonsignificant test statistic can be
determined (see also Kass & Raftery, 1995; Trafimow,













That is, the odds of H0 versus ¬H0 increase by a factor 1−αβj
after having obtained a nonsignificant test statistic,4 which
depends on our assessment of the power of the procedure.
To determine how plausible H0 is after having obtained
a nonsignificant result, we thus cannot avoid relying on a
subjective assessment of the power of the test based on what
we consider to be plausible alternatives to H0.
By combining Eq. 9 with the fact that Pj (H0) = 1 −
Pj (¬H0), we can obtain the plausibility of H0 after having
observed a nonsignificant result through
Pj(H0|¬R)= Pj (H0)P (¬R|H0)
Pj (H0)P (¬R|H0) + Pj (¬H0)Pj (¬R|¬H0)
=Pj (H0) 1 − α
βj + Pj (H0)(1 − α − βj ) . (10)
Equation 10 shows that our conclusion about the plausibility
of H0 should depend on our prior assessment of its
plausibility. It also shows that the degree to which H0
has become more plausible depends on our assessment of
the power of the test, which Eq. 5 shows depends on the
prior plausibility of the different specific alternatives to H0.
Thus, it is not possible to assess the degree to which the
data support H0 through NHST alone, and the evidential
approach to NHST cannot succeed if it does not take the
prior plausibility into account.
Equation 10 also illustrateswhy the confirmatory approach
to NHST cannot provide us with defensible guidelines for
accepting or rejecting H0. Since the confirmatory approach
does not take the prior plausibility of H0 into account, it
4Since we are considering a significance testing framework, it is
assumed here that we are only conditioning on whether a significant
result was obtained, and not on the exact p value.
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has to make a decision about the plausibility of H0 based
on the p value alone (Trafimow, 2003). However, the p
value only tells us whether the data are consistent with
the assumption being true, not whether this assumption is
actually likely to be true. That is, a p value only informs us
of the probability of obtaining data at least as extreme as the
data that were actually obtained conditional on the truth of
the null hypothesis, and it does not represent the probability
of that hypothesis being true given the data (Wagenmakers,
2007).
The fact that in practice the p value is often misinterpreted
as the probability that the null hypothesis is true (see
e.g., Guilford, 1978; Gigerenzer, 1993; Nickerson, 2000;
Wagenmakers & Grunwald, 2005; Wagenmakers, 2007)
already suggests that it is this probability that researchers
are often interested in Gigerenzer (1993). However, because
they do not address the prior plausibility of the assumption,
both the confirmatory and the evidential approach to NHST
are unable to inform the user how plausible it is that the
assumption is true after having taken the data into consideration.
Proponents of NHST might argue that we still should
avoid the subjective influence introduced by including the
prior plausibility in our assessment of model assumptions,
and that an objective decision rule based on the confir-
matory approach is still acceptable. They might state that
we simply have to accept uncertainty about our decision
about the model assumption: If we repeatedly use NHST
to evaluate model assumptions, we will be wrong in a cer-
tain proportion of times, and this is something that simply
cannot be avoided. But the problem is that the proportion
of times we can expect to be wrong if we simply accept
H0 when the test statistic is not significant also depends on
the prior probability of H0, as Eq. 10 shows. If our model
assumption cannot possibly be true, all failures to reject H0
are Type II errors, and the decision to accept H0 will be
wrong 100% of the time. Thus, this uncertainty about the
proportion of times that an accepted null hypothesis is in
fact wrong cannot at all be assessed without also assessing
the prior plausibility. However, it seems plausible that in the
context of evaluating model assumptions. it is exactly this
error rate (rather than the Type I and Type II error rates)
that is of most importance, as it determines the proportion of
times that we end up using an inappropriate statistical model
if we would rely solely on NHST.
To illustrate the risks of adopting the confirmatory
approach to NHST, we can consider the proportion of
times that a person following this approach can expect a
conclusion that H0 is true to be incorrect. Adopting the
confirmatory approach to NHST would mean accepting H0
whenever p ≥ α, regardless of its posterior plausibility.
If we accept a hypothesis for which we would assess the
posterior plausibility to be .70, we should expect such a
decision to be wrong 30% of the time (provided the prior
plausibility fully matched our prior beliefs). Thus, Eq. 10
can be used to determine the proportion of acceptances
of H0 that one can expect to be incorrect, for a given
assessment of the power and prior plausibility.
The impact of the prior plausibility on the proportion
of incorrect acceptances of H0 based on a null hypothesis
test (α = .05) is illustrated in Table 1. These results show
that even with an assessed power (1 − βj ) as high as .90,
person j can determine that she should expect to incorrectly
accept H0 in about 49% of times for hypotheses that she
a priori considers to be implausible (Pj (H0) = .1), or
even 91% of times if she considers hypotheses for which
Pj (H0) = .01. Thus, while power analysis is important in
evaluating the support that the model assumption receives,
Table 1 illustrates that a high power (or a claim about
severity, Mayo, 1996) alone is not sufficient to result in
convincing claims that the assumption is plausible enough
to be accepted (barring hypothetical cases where the power
is 1). Without assessing the prior plausibility, the plausibility
of the assumption after having observed the data can have
any value between 0 and 1 regardless of the p value that is
obtained.
Table 1 Proportion of acceptances of H0 based on a null hypothesis
test that person j should expect to be wrong, for varying levels of
power and prior plausibility (α = .05)
1 − βj
Pj (H0) .20 .50 .80 .90 .99
.01 .99 .98 .95 .91 .51
.10 .88 .83 .65 .49 .09
.20 .77 .68 .46 .30 .04
.50 .46 .34 .17 .10 .01
.80 .17 .12 .05 .03 .00
.90 .09 .06 .02 .01 .00
It is important here to emphasize that often model
assumptions are chosen not because they are deemed
plausible, but because of their mathematical convenience
or usefulness to develop a statistical model. If there is no
substantive theory that backs up these model assumptions
with convincing arguments, there is little reason to
assume that the model assumptions actually hold exactly,
and assigning a potentially very low (possibly 0) prior
plausibility to these assumptions may be the only reasonable
response. Consequently, testing such a priori implausible
exact null hypotheses in the hopes of finding enough support
to accept them may often be hopeless, since “[e]ssentially,
all models are wrong” (Box and Draper, 1987, p. 424). Our
models try to simplify reality with the goal of representing
it in a convenient and useful way, but because of this
simplification those models often cannot completely capture
556 Psychon Bull Rev (2018) 25:548–559
the vast complexity of the reality they try to represent. As
such, the idea that they are completely correct may in many
cases be highly implausible.
Luckily, a model does not need to be exactly correct
for its inferences to be useful. Many models are robust
to small or even large violations of their assumptions,
meaning that inferences made using the model might still be
(approximately) correct if the violations of the assumptions
are not too severe. This suggests that what researchers
should be after in evaluating model assumptions is not
confirming an a priori dismissible exact null hypothesis,
but rather an approximate null hypothesis (Berger & Sellke,
1987; Hoijtink, 2012) that specifies an admissible range
of values rather than point values for the parameter(s) that
relate to the model assumption. Such ‘robust’ approximate
null hypotheses might have a much higher prior plausibility,
making the effort to determine whether they should be
accepted more reasonable. Such hypotheses are also more
in line with what researchers are interested in: figuring out
whether the model assumption is not violated beyond an
acceptable limit. But regardless of whether we formulate our
model assumptions in the form of an exact null hypothesis
or an approximate null hypothesis, we want to assess the
plausibility of the assumptions that we have to make.
Hence, regardless of the precise specification of the null
hypothesis, the prior plausibility of that assumption needs
to be assessed.
Revisiting themotivating example
Since relying on NHST for the evaluation of the assumption
of equal variances will not provide her with a sufficient
assessment of the plausibility of that assumption, our
researcher could decide to make use of statistical methods
that do provide her with the information she needs. One
useful and accessible method for evaluating this assumption
has been proposed by Boing-Messing, van Assen, Hofman,
Hoijtink, & Mulder (2017), who make use of a Bayesian
statistical framework to evaluate hypotheses about group
variances. Their method allows users to contrast any number
of hypotheses about the relevant group variances. For each
pair of hypotheses, their procedure calculates a Bayes factor,
which captures the degree of support that the data provide
in favor of one hypothesis over the other (Kass & Raftery,
1995). The Bayes factor can range from 0 to infinity, with
values far removed from 1 indicating strong evidence in
favor of one of the hypotheses, and values close to 1
indicating that the data do not strongly favor one hypothesis
over the other. Such a continuous measure of support is
exactly what is needed to be able to update one’s assessment
of the plausibility of a hypothesis on the basis of new
empirical evidence (Morey, Romeijn, & Rouder, 2016).
Before the procedure can be applied, the researcher
has to decide on which hypotheses to consider. Since the
procedure has not yet been extended to cover approximate
null hypotheses, the focus will here be on evaluating the
exact null hypothesis of equal variances, contrasting H0 :
σ 2boys = σ 2girls with its complement. She then needs to
assess, based on her background knowledge, how plausible
she takes both of these hypotheses to be. If she has strong
background information that indicates that the variances
are likely not equal while still not dismissing it entirely,
she could specify Pj (H0) = .1 and Pj (¬H0) = .9. If
she instead would have believed that there is no specific
reason to suspect the assumption to be violated, it could be
that choosing Pj (H0) = .5 and Pj (¬H0) = .5 had made
sense to her (the default option offered by the procedure).
The benefit of the procedure of Boeing-Messing et al. is
that regardless of the choice of prior probabilities for the
hypotheses, the Bayes factor that is obtained remains the
same and provides an objective summary of the degree to
which the data support one hypothesis over the other.
In this case, a Bayes factor of 1.070 is obtained,
indicating that the data are almost equally likely to be
observed under H0 as under ¬H0, and hence the data
do not provide any real evidence in favor or against H0.
Consequently, the posterior plausibility of H0 hardly differs
from the prior plausibility: Pj (H0|X) = .106 if our
researcher used Pj (H0) = .1.5 Thus, if she were skeptical
about whether the model assumption held beforehand, she
will remain skeptical about it after seeing the data. This is
in stark contrast to the conclusion that she was led to using
the confirmatory NHST approach, where the nonsignificant
p value that was obtained led to an acceptance of H0.
Thus, using this Bayesian approach in which she was
able to take her background information into account, she
has to conclude that there is little reason to accept that
the model assumption holds, and has to question whether
she should rely on inferences obtained based on models
that assume equal variances. Developing more elaborate
Bayesian procedures that allow for approximate hypotheses
could be helpful here for assessing whether the assumption
at least approximately holds. It may also be helpful for her
to consider an estimation framework and attempt to assess
the severity of the violation, as this could help her decide
whether the model can still be relied upon to some degree.
Conclusions
Evaluating the plausibility of model assumptions is a crucial
step that needs to be passed before one can justify the
use of a statistical model for making inferences. However,
5And Pj (H0|X) = .517 if she had used Pj (H0) = .5.
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traditional NHST-based approaches to testing statistical
model assumptions only provide ordinal information about
the plausibility of the assumptions after having taken the
data into account. Because of this, NHST-based procedures
alone cannot provide sufficient information to determine
whether it is plausible that the model assumptions hold and
whether we can trust the inferences that are made using the
model.
A good NHST-based test may still have the potential of
providing a critical test for the model assumption, provided
that the test is applied in the right situation: with high power
and low α, obtaining a nonsignificant test statistic makes
the model assumption much more plausible than it was
before having observed the data. If the model assumption
was already quite plausible to begin with, this might give
us sufficient confidence in the assumption to apply the
model. However, with low power or a priori implausible
model assumptions, a nonsignificant result provides us with
insufficient reason to accept the model assumption.
Because NHST does not take prior plausibility into
account, it also cannot determine the actual power of the
test and fails at providing the user with sufficient tools to
adequately control the error rate that is most important when
evaluating model assumptions: the probability of failing to
reject an assumption that is violated. Thus, NHST-based
approaches to evaluating model assumptions are insensitive
to factors that should affect the conclusion that is drawn
about the plausibility of the model assumption (see also
Trafimow, 2003). Application of NHST without taking the
prior plausibility into account may thus result in misleading
conclusions about the plausibility of the model assumptions,
which threatens the validity of the statistical inferences
made using the model. Without taking this prior plausibility
of model assumptions into account, it is unclear how
we can be warranted in, for example, claiming that two
groups differ significantly in their means, or that the mean
difference is likely to fall within a certain interval, since all
of these inferences depend on whether the model (at least
approximately) holds.
By incorporating information about the prior plausibility
of the model assumption and its alternatives in NHST-based
testing procedures, the actual confirmatory power of such
a procedure can be assessed. However, it may be more
fruitful to abandon the idea that all the information about the
model assumption is accurately captured by a dichotomized
p value (see also Cohen, 1994; Wagenmakers, 2007), and
make use of all the information that is available in the data
to assess the assumption. Considering statistical measures
such as the Bayes factor that capture the relative support
of a model assumption over its complement may be more
informative and relevant for determining the plausibility
of that assumption (see for example Tijmstra, Sijtsma &
Hoijtink, 2015).
Plausibility is not a dichotomous concept, even if in the end
we do want to make a decision about whether the assump-
tion is plausible enough to apply the model. Recognizing
that there are degrees of plausibility and degrees of support
is important, and we have to acknowledge that there are sit-
uations in which we may not be sure if we are confident
enough about the truth of our model assumptions to use the
model. If we conclude that the assumption is not as plausible
as we would have liked, we will have to be more cautious
in using the model to make inferences, or we may con-
clude that we do not have enough confidence in the model
assumptions and refrain from applying the model, and have
to search for a more general model that better captures the
structure in the data. Estimating plausible sizes of suspected
violations would also be helpful for determining the extent
to which inferences can still be relied upon.
Prespecifying a general ‘minimal level’ of posterior plausi-
bility that is needed before we can safely apply the
model would ignore that different situations call for dif-
ferent degrees of certainty about our inferences. Confirma-
tory analyses may call for higher levels of certainty than
exploratory analyses, as the evidential standards may be
higher in the former case. High-stakes testing situations
(e.g., for making decisions about individuals) may require
even more certainty about the assumptions before we draw
any conclusions. Thus, the choice for the required level of
plausibility should depend on contextual factors.
Having to deal with prior plausibility may complicate the
way in which model assumptions are evaluated, but it is at
the gain of being able to determine howmuch confidence we
should have in the statistical inferences that we make using
our models. One can aim at minimizing possible subjective
influences on this assessment of prior plausibility by formaliz-
ing explicit procedures for eliciting these epistemic judgments
on the basis of the relevant information that is available (see
for example O’Hagan et al., 2006), and by being explicit
about the type of information that is considered to be rel-
evant. The alternative—not assessing prior plausibility—is
much more problematic, since under such an approach
it will always remain uncertain whether a model can be
trusted. Even worse, we will not have any information about
the extent of this uncertainty. Thus, if we want our statistical
and substantive conclusions to be valid, ignoring the prior
plausibility of model assumptions is not an option.
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